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LYCEUM

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Aristotle's Form of the Species as Relation

Theodore Di Maria, Jr.

The question of the nature and status of Aristotelian forms has divided scholars into three general camps: those who argue that forms are particular, those who argue they are universal, and those who maintain that forms can be regarded both as particular and as universal. Each of these approaches can cite various passages in Aristotle for textual support and has the advantage of evading difficulties arising from the other approaches. However, due to fundamental problems arising from the former two approaches, which will be outlined below, the following paper will adopt the third strategy and distinguish between form in the sense of a principle of organization for a particular, concrete object (particular form) and form in the sense of species (species form), which is a universal. The concept of the species form is the central feature in this interpretation, and it will be argued that the species form is best understood as a type of ***relation*** holding between particular forms. The species form, so construed, is ontologically dependent upon the particular form, i.e. requires the particular form for its existence, but has objective, ontological status as a real feature of the world. The species form's objective status as a relation enables it to be a basis for Aristotle's realism about universals that neither reduces them to concepts in the mind (conceptualism) nor identifies them with entities such as Platonic Forms. However, it must be emphasized at the outset that the aim of the paper is not to argue that Aristotle expressly defends the notion of the species form as a relation. Rather, it is to argue that this interpretation of the species form is consistent with many of Aristotle's major texts and doctrines, helps render crucial texts and doctrines intelligible, and can be viewed as implied by at least some texts.

The paper will be divided into five main sections. The first section will outline standard versions of the three approaches to Aristotelian forms described above. The second section will consist of two parts: the first part describes the notion of a particular form, and the second part describes the crucial concept of the species form. The third section will examine the role of the species form in

Aristotle's discussion of definition and substance in the ***Metaphysics***. The fourth section will consider two interpretive advantages to the present interpretation that were not brought to light in the previous analysis. The fifth and final section will address two possible objections to the present interpretation beyond those considered in the previous analysis.

I
Three Standard Approaches to Aristotle's Treatment of Form

Several scholars hold the view that Aristotle regards forms as particular rather than universal and defend the correlative view that Aristotle is either a nominalist or a conceptualist. Edward D. Harter, for example, uses Aristotle's account of change to argue that forms are particular.[1] Harter explains that change, for Aristotle, occurs when a privation-in-a-substratum gives way to an eidos(form)-in-a-substratum. In other words, change occurs when a substratum with the potentiality of receiving a form comes into possession of a form that it previously lacked. Thus the form is both actuality since it provides an object with its identifiable characteristics and it is also a fundamental principle of change, and when the change involves becoming a new substance the form is called the "substantial form". Harter contends, however, that the "substantial form is not universal," because "change, coming-to-be, is an affair of individual complexes; there is no change apart from these; and the principles and causes...are principles present in these (individual complexes)." (Harter, p. 14; parentheses added) Nevertheless, Harter does not believe that this view of forms as particular principles of change entails that there is ***no*** sense in which

[1] In addition to Harter, whose position is under consideration here, similar views have been defended by A.R. Lacey in "Ousia and Form in Aristotle", ***Phronesis*** 10 (1965), 363-82, and A.C. Lloyd, ***Forms and Universals in Aristotle***, Great Britain: Francis Cairns, 1981. One of the more direct statements of the view that form is not universal is expressed by Wilfred Sellars who says, "Certainly the form of a material substance is not a universal, for, as Aristotle reiterates, the form is 'the substance of' the composite, and the substance of a this must be of the nature of a this and never a universal." (Sellars, p. 691).

forms can be taken as universal. Rather, he maintains that it is possible to understand the form as universal in the minds of those who consider the particular instances of them. Harter says that "for Aristotle at least, there are universals only because there are natural kinds, and a natural kind is determined by the constitutions of its individual members. The character of the universal in the mind is determined by the characters of the individuals in the world; it is not the other way around." (Harter, p. 17) Thus Harter's position can be regarded as a type of ‘conceptualism’ in which universals are thought to exist only insofar as particulars are apprehended in a universal manner by the knowing mind.[2]

However, the fundamental difficulty of denying that universals have ontological status independently of human apprehension is that it is inconsistent with Aristotle’s concept of ***episteme***, or scientific knowledge. As Aristotle argues in ***Metaphysics Zeta*** 15, scientific knowledge can only be of what is definable, but what is definable is the universal, not the particular. Thus, if one denies objective ontological status to universals, then one is denying that scientific knowledge comprehends definable realities in the world. The issues of scientific knowledge and the appropriate objects of definition will be discussed in more detail in section III below. What is important presently, however, is that the inconsistency between Harter’s view that there are only particular forms and Aristotle’s concept of scientific knowledge might incline one to adopt the opposing position that Aristotelian forms are exclusively universal. James Lesher adopts this position but contends that it leads Aristotle immediately into an insuperable contradiction based upon his acceptance of all

[2] The argument which shall be given below will, like Harter's analysis, base the ontological status of a universal such as the species form upon the particular forms which are ontologically prior to it. However, the species form will be acknowledged to have ontological status as a real principle independent of conceptualization. Of course, the following account does not require a denial that a universal can be abstracted from the perception of sensible particulars and conceptualized in the understanding as Aristotle describes in the ***Posterior Analytics*** (100 a3-8). Rather, the account will provide a means of explaining how the universal abstracted in conceptualization reflects a real part of the world that is independent of the human intellect and is the basis of scientific knowledge.

three of the following propositions: "(A) No universal can be a substance. (B) The form is universal. (C) The form is that which is most truly substance." (Lesher, p. 169) Proposition A presumably derives its force from Aristotle's attacks upon Platonic Forms, particularly his express denial in ***Zeta*** 13 that universals can be substances. The issue of whether Aristotle intends to assert that there is ***no*** sense in which a universal can be a substance also will be discussed in section III, but Lesher's view is that Aristotle unequivocally denies substantiality to universals. Among the arguments Lesher uses to support Proposition B is a line of reasoning, similar to the one above, describing the difficulties that would arise for Aristotle's concept of scientific knowledge if universals are denied ontological status. Finally, in support of Proposition C, Lesher simply cites several passages from Aristotle in which he advances the view that form is that which is most truly substance.[3] Thus, if Lesher's analysis is correct, then it appears that adopting the position that there are only universal forms in Aristotle yields a result that is as undesirable as the inconsistency between exclusively particular forms and the concept of scientific knowledge, namely, that Aristotle's fundamental doctrines concerning form, substance, and universals are contradictory.

Clearly if there is a more charitable reading of Aristotle that will allow him to avoid this apparent contradiction without denying the ontological status of universals, then such a reading is preferable. There appears to be only one viable alternative for this more charitable reading, which is to adopt the view that Aristotle allows for both particular forms and universal forms.[4] Rogers Albritton attempts this third approach by trying to locate textual evidence in the ***Metaphysics*** that Aristotle holds that there are both particular and universal forms. On Albritton's reading, the problem is not in providing textual evidence that Aristotle thought there are universal forms, but rather the difficulty is in

[3] Lesher cites ***Metaphysics*** 1032 b1-2, 1033 b17, 1037 a 27 ff., 1041 b6, 1050 b2.

[4] There remains, of course, the logical possibility of arguing that forms are neither particular nor universal for Aristotle, but such a view appears to be meaningless and contrary to textual evidence.

finding evidence that there are particular forms. According to Albritton, the best evidence that there are particular forms is located in Book ***Lambda*** of the ***Metaphysics***, but there is also some evidence of this view ***Zeta*** 10 and 11. The following discussion will pursue this third alternative by exploring the case that there are both particular forms and universal forms in Aristotle as the best possibility of resolving the difficulties of the first two approaches cited above.

II
Particular Forms and Species Forms

A. Particular Forms

The present discussion will begin by clarifying the concept of particular form before considering the status of the species form (i.e., universal form) since it will be argued that the latter concept and reality presuppose the former concept and reality. The discussion will be based upon the notion of form found in Aristotle's account of composite substances in the ***Metaphysics***, i.e., his account of substances composed of both material and formal principles, although the conclusions drawn may apply to forms existing independently of matter as well, such as an unmoved mover. In light of these prefatory remarks, a particular form can be understood as the principle of organization and unity intrinsic to an object, or, as in the case of Aristotle's familiar example of a bronze statue, it can be understood simply as the structure or shape of an object. The particular form is thus a set of basic functions, or a structure, around which the independent activities, secondary functions (such as those of its organs), and parts of an object are organized into the activities, secondary functions, and parts of a unified whole. The basic functions constituting the particular form are the essential features which both make the thing into the object that it is and render intelligible the functions of its parts in relation to the object as a whole. For example, the independent functioning of the various organs of the human body such as the stomach, eyes, and brain can be explained and rendered intelligible through the contributions they make to the basic nutritive, sensitive, and

rational[5] functions that Aristotle identifies with the human soul as the form of a human being. It is also important to emphasize that the particular form has these functions relative to a particular quantum of matter (i.e. if the object is a composite substance). As the basic functions enforming a particular quantum of matter the particular form is numerically distinct from every other instance of form.[6]

The best direct textual evidence in the ***Metaphysics*** to support this notion of a particular form is located primarily in Book ***Lambda***. Aristotle there maintains that, "the causes of different individuals are different, your matter and form and moving cause being different from mine, while in their universal definition they are the same." (***Metaphysics***, 1071 a 27-29) Aristotle's point, of course, is that the complex of material, efficient, and formal principles in each human being must be differentiated from the complex of these principles in every other human being since we are discrete, individuated substances. In other words, the existence of discrete, individuated human beings is explained by our unique causal principles. Consequently, our particular forms, or souls, as particular human beings are numerically distinct principles of organization of our particular bodies even though the same formula or definition will apply to each of our souls given our identity ***qua*** human beings. Moreover, this conclusion about the presence of particular forms within human beings can be generalized as applying, ***mutatis mutandis***,[7] to all composite substances.

Additional textual support for the notion of particular forms is located in ***Zeta*** 10 where this concept is contained in Aristotle's claim that, "Man and

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[5] This, of course, assumes a contemporary perspective about the brain as the organ for cognition and thought.

[6] In Substantial Knowledge, C.D.C. Reeve proposes the notion of "universal forms" to fulfill the role attributed to the particular form here. Thus, Reeve says that, "universal forms carve up or individuate the world into particular objects of singular significance," (Reeve, p. 131) or, in other words, the "universal form" provides to matter the essential determinations and functions that render matter into the particular composite objects that we encounter empirically.

[7] For example, as indicated above, the particular form of some inanimate objects is best described as a structure or shape rather than a functional ordering of parts.

horse and terms which are thus applied to individuals, but universally, are not substance but something composed of this particular formula and this particular matter treated as universal..." (***Metaphysics***, 1035 b 27-30). "Particular formula" in this passage refers to a man's or horse's particular form, and Aristotle is thus observing here that a universal term such as 'man' or 'horse' applies to a particular man or horse by virtue of its particular form. How the particular form can be understood as the principle that enables particular substances to be categorized into species or kinds will be described in more detail below. The essential point for the moment, however, is that there is clear textual support that Aristotle maintained a doctrine of particular forms.[8]

B. Species Form

The foregoing description of the concept of 'particular form' provides the background for the following discussion of the notion of 'species form', the nature and status of which is one of the crucial issues in the present interpretation of Aristotle's analysis of form.[9] There are a variety of interpretive advantages, which will be discussed below, for thinking that a 'species form' is best understood as a relational concept.[10] More precisely, the species form

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[8] It is frequently thought that ***Zeta*** 13 provides additional support for the view that forms are particular since Aristotle there contends that, "it is plain that no universal is a substance," (***Metaphysics***, 1038 b35) and in light of ***Zeta*** 10 and 11's doctrine that form is substance it follows that the form is particular. However, in ***A Map of Metaphysics Zeta***, Myles Burnyeat rejects the claim that ***Zeta*** 13 provides textual support for the particularity of form (Burnyeat, p. 52). Burnyeat's conclusion rests on his idiosyncratic reading of ***Zeta*** 13 as constituting an independent inquiry from ***Zeta*** 10 and 11, and while this is an interesting interpretive claim it can probably be claimed with equal justice that these are stages in a single argument concluding that substance is form.

[9] The focus of the following analysis will be the concept of species, but the arguments about the relational status of a species apply also to the genus. Both concepts are universal forms that are ontologically dependent on particular forms, and the difference in extension between the concept of a species and the concept of a genus is immaterial to the status of each as a real relation.

[10] In "Aristotle's Realism," Martin Tweedale similarly suggests that, "sameness in species is an equivalence relation." (Tweedale, p. 515) Although Tweedale's paper and the present one are superficially similar insofar as both recognize that species are a type of relation, Tweedale's

should be understood as a real relation of functional identity holding between numerically distinct particular forms that allows individuals to be classified as members of the same kind. A relation of functional identity holds between numerically distinct particular forms when the individuals possessing those forms each has the capacity for exercising the same fundamental functions, or possesses the same structure or shape, relative to their own quantum of matter. For example, the nutritive, sensitive, and rational functions of Socrates' soul that enform Socrates' body stand in a relation of functional identity with the same functions of Callias' soul that enform Callias' body, and this relation of functional identity is what enables both individuals to belong to the class of human beings. Thus, an individual can be said to possess a species form, and be a member of a species, when that individual is related to other actual or possible individuals by virtue of possessing identical fundamental functions.

Several important points of clarification about the notion of species form are necessary here. First, it should be evident from the previous description that the species form is ***ontologically dependent*** on the particular form since there cannot be a relation of functional identity holding between individuals unless there is at least one actual individual exhibiting the functions in question. Of course, this does not preclude fictional or imaginary individuals from belonging to fictional or imaginary species. Yet even in this case the species form must be conceived as ontologically dependent on the particular forms of the individuals that are fictionally or imaginatively related since such

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objectives, arguments, and conclusions contrast sharply those of this essay. For example, Tweedale views forms exclusively as particulars, seems to regard universals in a fundamentally conceptualist manner (Tweedale, p. 513), considers his interpretation to be defended expressly by Aristotle, and endeavors to refute the notion that Aristotle is a "robust realist." None of these applies to the present paper. Moreover, I believe that Tweedale's notion of an "equivalence relation" is ambiguous since it might refer to the conceptual, ontological, epistemological, or numerical equivalence of the terms, and Tweedale does not clarify it further. This ambiguity in Tweedale is significant since the manner in which 'species' is construed as a relation will be crucial for the present interpretation of Aristotle's analysis. See Martin Tweedale, "Aristotle's Realism," ***Canadian Journal of Philosophy***, vol. 18, no. 3, (September 1988), pp. 501-526.

dependence is essential to the relation of these two types of form. Secondly, in general and aside from the exception of fictional and imaginary individuals and species, the species form must be granted objective ontological status since it is a ***real*** relation holding between the particular forms of actual and possible individuals. In other words, the species form is a genuine aspect of the objective world and does not exist only conceptually through abstraction from particular forms. Thirdly, the species form must be regarded as ***universal*** since each member of a species must stand in a relation of functional identity with every other actual and possible member of the species. This meaning of the universality of a species form prevents it from being conflated with a Platonic Form despite the objective ontological status of both of these types of form. A Platonic Form must be regarded paradoxically as both universal to every member of a species and also as a particular member of that species. The latter feature of a Platonic Form clearly cannot be asserted of the relational meaning of the species form suggested here.

Before describing some of the advantages the foregoing account has for interpreting Aristotle's texts, it will be helpful to clarify further the distinction between particular form and species form by placing it in the broader context of the ***Metaphysics***. This will be achieved in the next section by relating the distinction to some basic features of Aristotle's analysis of the definitions underlying scientific knowledge and to his treatment of the concept of substance.

III
Definition, Substance, and Form

The role of the species form as the object of a definition yielding scientific knowledge emerges from three fundamental positions expressed in the ***Metaphysics***: (1) "definition and essence in the primary and simple sense belong to ***substances***." (***Metaphysics***, 1030b 5-6) In ***Zeta*** 4, Aristotle allows that we can speak in a derivative sense of essences and definitions of categories such as

qualities and quantities, but he insists that essences and definitions belong primarily to substances, and this is presumably because the other categories depend on substance for their being; (2) a definition must be of the ***universal*** rather than the particular. As Aristotle holds in ***Zeta*** 15, "If then demonstration is of necessary truths and definition is a scientific process...clearly there can neither be definition of nor demonstration about sensible individuals;" (***Metaphysics***, 1039b31-1040a2)[11] and finally (3) Aristotle seems to conclude in favor of form as substance in ***Zeta*** 3 after he identifies matter, the composite, and form as the possible candidates for substance but eliminates the former two alternatives. In light of these three positions, if the species form can be regarded as a type of substance, then it is the species form rather than the particular form which is the object of a definition since the species form would be described by all three of the points above. The particular form, in contrast, is precluded from being the immediate object of a definition by the position expressed in the second point since it is not universal.

Keeping these considerations in mind, it is necessary to establish the sense in which the species form can be regarded as a type of substance before describing how it functions as the object of a definition. For this purpose, a discussion of key texts in the ***Metaphysics*** concerning the nature of substance is needed. Naturally, an exhaustive account of these texts is impossible here due to their subtlety and complexity, which have led to disagreements among commentators concerning even whether matter, form, or the composite is most properly regarded as substance. Thus, the following brief discussion has the modest objective of highlighting salient features of Aristotle's analysis of substance for the purpose of illuminating further the concept of a species form.

It is perhaps best to begin this brief discussion of the concept of substance by recognizing that Aristotle's chief project of ***Metaphysics Zeta*** is to identify the principle or type of being that is most primarily substance and to

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[11] Aristotle also contends in ***Zeta*** 10 that, "when we come to the concrete thing…there is no definition, but they are known by the aid of intuitive thinking or of perception" (***Metaphysics***, 1036a 1-6).

address some puzzles and issues surrounding this question. In ***Zeta*** 3, Aristotle presents two criteria that can be regarded separately as necessary conditions, and perhaps collectively as sufficient ones, for identifying a principle or being as substance when he states that, "both separability and 'thisness' are thought to belong chiefly to substance." (***Metaphysics***, 1029a 27-28)[12] Mary Louise Gill offers the useful suggestion that the criteria of 'thisness' and 'separability' each have two senses, and there seem to be two sorts of principles or beings that satisfy the thisness criterion, and two ways in which a principle or being could satisfy the separability criterion. Largely following Gill, the criterion of 'thisness' can be satisfied by a particular individual such as Socrates, presumably because such an individual is a subject to which other predicates belong without itself ever being a predicate. In addition, the criterion of 'thisness' can be satisfied by a species or universal designated by a phrase such as 'this ***human being***' (a 'this ***something***) since such a phrase indicates a determinate kind distinguished from other kinds. Similarly, the criterion of 'separability' can mean either separable in account or separable in existence. Separability in account occurs when it is possible to provide a definition of a principle without referring in that definition to an additional, distinct principle; e.g., if a thing's form is separable in account, then one can define it without referring to the thing's matter in that definition. Separability in existence is presumably the sort of ontological independence that allows something to be a subject of predicates without itself ever being a predicate, which parallels the first sense of 'thisness.'[13]

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[12] It is evident that Aristotle views thisness and separability as necessary conditions for qualifying as a substance, but it is less apparent that they should be regarded as sufficient conditions. This is because, as will be described below, a composite seems to satisfy both criteria yet Aristotle quickly rejects it as a candidate for substance. The importance of separability and thisness for the understanding of substance is first noted in the ***Metaphysics*** at ***Delta*** 8 (***Metaphysics***, 1017b 23-25) where Aristotle describes these criteria as one of two senses of 'substance,' the other being a substratum not predicated of anything else.

[13] See Gill, ***Aristotle on Substance***, pp. 31-38 for her discussion of these criteria.

Aristotle's Form of the Species as Relation

With the criteria of thisness and separability in hand, Aristotle sets out to determine the principle or being that is most fundamentally identified as substance. In ***Zeta*** 3, Aristotle famously considers matter, the composite, and form as candidates for substance, but summarily rejects the former two possibilities. In addressing the issue of whether matter might be substance, Aristotle rejects this as "impossible; for both separability and 'thisness' are thought to belong chiefly to substance." (***Metaphysics***, 1029a27) Matter, divested of all determining characteristics and independent of a form which organizes it into a determinate being, is a completely undetermined potentiality rather than a determinate ***this*** in either of the senses mentioned above. Moreover, as a completely undetermined, pure potentiality matter has no essence that can be defined and is thus not separable in account, nor is it separate in existence since matter exists only determinately and is thus dependent on a form. After this brief consideration of matter's candidacy as substance,[14] Aristotle quickly dismisses the composite as most fundamentally substance by asserting that, "The substance compounded of both, i.e. of matter and shape, may be dismissed; for it is posterior…." (***Metaphysics***, 1029a31) Aristotle's point is simply that if matter is not the fundamental substance, then neither is the composite of matter and form since matter, as one of the

[14] The issues here are, of course, complex and much that can be said in defense of the candidacy of matter as substance. For example, Michael Loux is one of many to observe that "proximate matter", i.e. the particular matter comprising a composite substance of a given kind, plays a significant role in the explanation of a substance, and might even enter into the composite's definition. Nevertheless, as Loux acknowledges in ***Primary Ousia***, this does not imply that proximate matter is itself properly regarded as substance for "although no complete account of why things are oak trees or human beings can fail to make reference to the kind of stuff out of which they are composed, what functions as matter in an account of this sort is of itself a thing for which it is possible to provide something analogous to the ousia explanation into which it enters" (Loux, p. 158). In other words, a further account or definition can be provided of such matter, so it cannot be regarded as separable in account.

composite's constitutive principles, "precedes" the composite in being.[15] Indeed, Aristotle's swift dismissal of the composite is somewhat remarkable and puzzling here since he emphasizes the importance of thisness and separability for the concept of substance just lines before he rejects the composite, and yet the composite seems to be a good candidate for satisfying at least one sense of both criteria. Nevertheless, the elimination of matter and the composite leaves the form as the remaining viable candidate for 'substance.'

However, while it will be seen below that the species form plainly satisfies at least one sense of the thisness and separability criteria of substance, it is not immediately evident that the same claim can be made about the particular form. This result is noteworthy since we have seen that the species form is ontologically dependent on the particular form, and so it conflicts with the result one might reasonably expect. The discussion will proceed with the more difficult case of whether the particular form satisfies both of these criteria before providing a description of how the species form satisfies them.

The particular form, ***qua*** particular, obviously fails to satisfy the second sense of the thisness criterion since it is not a determinate kind or universal, but it can be argued that it meets the thisness criterion in the first sense, namely, as a particular individual that is a subject but never itself a predicate. The particular form can be understood to meet the first sense of the thisness criterion through its relation to a concrete individual, which seems non-controversially to meet the first sense of the thisness criterion. This relation is crucial because a particular individual such as Socrates is arguably identical with the soul that is his particular form since his soul is the organizing principle that makes him the being that he is.[16] Thus, if Socrates is identical with his soul, and Socrates is a subject that is never a predicate, then Socrates' soul is a

[15] Whether Aristotle means to suggest that matter precedes the composite not only ontologically in the sense described above, but also conceptually, i.e., "in account", is a more complex issue that does not need to be resolved for the present purposes.

[16] Even if Socrates is identified with his form, or soul, because it is his soul that makes him the being that he is, it should be clear that Socrates' soul cannot function as an organizing principle unless it stands in relation to his body.

subject that is never a predicate. In this manner a particular form can be thought to satisfy the thisness criterion. However, the case for the particular form satisfying the separability criterion is more problematic. In its most common manifestation as a principle of a composite substance, the particular form seems neither separate in existence since it cannot exist independently of matter, nor separate in account since we have seen that on Aristotle's view the particular cannot be the object of a definition. However, perhaps the best case that can be made for the particular form satisfying the separability criterion is that it is separate in account. For although the particular form, ***qua*** particular, is indefinable, it provides the ontological basis for the species form that is both the object of a definition and, as will be seen subsequently, separate in account. In other words, the relation of functional identity that applies universally to members of a species is real and definable because of the particular forms that are its terms, and thus the particular form can be said to be indirectly separable in account through the definition of the species form that it makes possible. Thus, if it is granted that the particular form indirectly satisfies the separability criterion, then it is reasonable to conclude that the particular form meets both of the necessary conditions for substance. Nevertheless, the failure of the particular form more immediately to satisfy the separability criterion for substance is a potential obstacle both for interpreting Aristotle as positing particular forms and for thinking that he would have regarded such forms as substances even if he posited them.

Fortunately, however, the species form satisfies both the thisness and separability criteria more straightforwardly than does the particular form. First, the species form satisfies the second sense of the thisness criteria by being a determinate kind, or universal, distinguished from other kinds, which is represented by phrases such as 'this human being'. Secondly, the species form satisfies the first sense of the separability criterion by being separate in account. For it is unnecessary to appeal to a further, distinct principle or being such as a thing's matter in order to define a species form. For example, defining a human being in terms of the soul's three functions does not require referring in the

definition to the matter of which human beings are composed. Nor does defining the species form require incorporating the particular form into its definition despite the species form's ontological dependence on the particular form. For example, one need not refer to Socrates' soul, or any other individual human being's soul, in defining 'human being' even though the existence of the species depends upon the existence of at least one member. As a result of satisfying these two criteria, the species form can be regarded as a type of substance. Equally importantly for the present discussion, the species form conforms to all three of the Aristotelian positions stated at the outset of this section concerning an object of a definition yielding scientific knowledge. Accordingly, the species form is properly regarded as such an object.[17]

Having thus demonstrated that the species form is a type of substance and an object of a definition it is finally possible to provide a short description of how the species form functions as the object of a definition. It will be recalled that the particular form, ***qua*** particular, cannot itself be the object of a definition, but it can be described as a set of fundamental functions that stand in a relation of functional identity with other actual or possible particular forms. The species form is this relation of functional identity, and to define it is both to isolate the functions of the particular forms that allow them to be so related to others and to state these functions in a general formula. Thus what is expressed in the definition are the essential characteristics belonging to every actual and possible[18] member of a class. A particular being belongs to a species because its fundamental (essential) functions are common to some other actual or possible beings. In other words, the species is predicable of the concrete individual because of its particular form. The definition of the species form thus applies universally to its members, can be stated without reference to any particular member, and thus has a type of permanence that allows it to yield scientific knowledge of objects. Once again, it is important to emphasize that as

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[17] It should be evident that the analysis provided here of the species would also hold true of another universal, namely, the genus.

[18] The importance of including 'possible members' of the class will be discussed below.

a definable relation the species form is ontologically dependent on the particular forms that are its terms, but that the definition of the species form does not refer to any individual particular form in its formula.

After completing this discussion of the meaning of the concepts of the particular form and the species form it is now possible to describe some of the interpretive advantages of the previous analysis and to address some difficulties related to it.

IV
Interpretive Advantages to the Present Interpretation

The preceding account of the distinction between particular form and species form has a number of interpretive advantages for Aristotle's treatment of substance and form in the ***Metaphysics***. As a prefatory remark to the discussion of these advantages, it is important to emphasize again that although there is textual evidence in Aristotle's works for a distinction between particular forms and species forms, he does not expressly defend the concept of the species form as a real relation of functional identity holding between actual and possible members of a class. Nevertheless, this view of the species form does yield the advantages below and is consistent with central Aristotelian texts and doctrines.

One advantage of the account of the species form as a real relation holding between actual and possible members of a class is that it establishes an explanation and foundation for Aristotle's realism concerning scientific knowledge of universals. It is, of course, widely recognized that Aristotle held the epistemologically realistic view that our scientific knowledge of universals corresponds to a reality existing independently of human cognition. Aristotle's perspective on this issue naturally raises the question of how universals can have the objective status necessary for such realism without being posited as entities on the order of Platonic Forms. The interpretation of the species form as a real relation holding between actual and possible members of a class provides an answer to this question since the species form, so construed, exists

objectively and independently of the human intellect that grasps it. This interpretation thus prevents the reduction of Aristotle's view of universals both to a Platonism that posits them as particular, eternal entities and to a conceptualism that would ascribe to them only epistemic status and deny their objectivity, which is inconsonant with Aristotle's broader realistic perspective.

However, one might object that the present interpretation does not yield the advantage of preserving Aristotle's realism because it rests on a faulty concept of what constitutes a ***real*** relation. According to this objection, a real relation requires two ***actual*** terms, but the present interpretation regards the relation constituting a species form to be real for a class having only one actual member bearing a relation of functional identity to merely possible members. In response to this objection, it is important first to note that any interpretation of the concept of 'species' in Aristotle must allow for species having only one member since Aristotle himself expressly acknowledges such species. For example, Aristotle indicates in ***Zeta*** 15 that the sun is a unique particular, i.e. belongs to a species with only one member, and he also contends that its status as the sole member of a class leads some to think falsely that it is definable ***qua*** particular. Aristotle holds that, "people err [in attempting to define the sun ***qua*** particular]...by the mention [in the definition] of attributes which can belong to another subject; e.g. if another thing with the stated attributes comes into existence, clearly it will be a sun; the formula therefore is general." (***Metaphysics***, 1040 b30-1040 b1; parentheses added) Aristotle's claim here is that the attempt to define the sun will refer to general attributes that can apply to other possible suns, and thus that the definition formulated does not define the sun ***qua*** particular. In addition, the definition places the sun in relation to other possible members in its class (suns) by virtue of attributes that are essential properties for beings of that kind. In other words, what allows a general definition to be formulated for a class with only one actual member is the relation of functional identity holding between the one actual member and other ***possible*** members of that class.

Yet although these considerations provide a textual basis for the present interpretation's claim that a relation of functional identity holds even for a species with only one actual member, it does not address the objection that a real relation requires two ***actual*** terms whereas the present interpretation regards the relation constituting a species form as real as long as it has one actual term. There are, however, some clear responses to this objection. First, it should be noted that there are ubiquitous examples of relations holding between actual beings and possible beings that seem best described as real relations. For example, throughout the animal kingdom behaviors having procreative ends, such as the nesting behavior of birds, relate the actual members of a species to their potential offspring. Indeed, these behaviors, whether attributed to blind instinct or some other impulse, are based upon, and are rendered intelligible by, a relation between actual and possible members of the species of animals in question. Moreover, the number of real relations having actual and possible terms increases dramatically when one considers the manifold behaviors of human beings that are based upon their relation to an assortment of possible beings including potential children, deities, wealth, ice cream sundaes, political ideals, etc. Secondly, a more obvious Aristotelian rejoinder to the objection is that it presupposes that reality is exhausted by what is actual, which entails denying reality to potentiality as a type of possibility. Of course, denying reality to what is potential certainly might be a tenable metaphysical position, but it is clearly inconsistent with an Aristotelian framework. Most Aristotelians would thus probably regard the cost of accepting the objection above as too prohibitive, and these two rejoinders can be used to defend the present interpretation's claim to provide a basis for Aristotle's realism.

A second major advantage of the present interpretation is that it offers a way to resolve the presumed inconsistency between the three Aristotelian doctrines cited by Lesher in section one above. It will be recalled that Lesher contends that there is a fundamental inconsistency between the positions expressed in these three propositions: (A) No universal can be a substance; (B) The form is universal; and (C) The form is that which is most truly substance.

Lesher is correct in holding that there is a formal inconsistency between these statements, but this inconsistency is eliminated when it is understood that the term 'form' is ambiguous and has two different senses in the propositions. In light of the previous discussion, the two different senses of the term 'form' in the propositions are 'species form' and 'particular form'. When Aristotle defends the view in Proposition B that the form is universal, the term 'form' seems very clearly to signify the species form since it is the species form and not the particular form that is a universal. In contrast, to the extent that Aristotle truly defends the view expressed in Proposition C that the form is that which is most truly substance, the term 'form' is probably best understood as 'particular form'. The reasons for interpreting the term 'form' as 'particular form' in Proposition C, notwithstanding the difficulty that the particular form has in satisfying the separability criterion, are twofold: (1) in determining what is most fundamentally substance Aristotle seems to place priority, if one considers the broader analyses of both the ***Metaphysics*** and the ***Categories***, on the thisness criterion of substance as a particular that is a subject but never a predicate. It is the particular form and not the species form that satisfies this sense of the thisness criterion. In addition, (2) the ontological dependence of the species form on the particular form seems to make the particular form more fundamentally a subject and thus more truly substance. Accordingly, when Aristotle defends the view that no universal can be substance in Proposition A, this is best understood as asserting that the species form cannot be regarded as most truly and fundamentally substance, but this does not imply the same conclusion about the particular form. Thus, if one interprets these propositions in light of the particular form/species form distinction it removes the apparent inconsistency between these three fundamental positions that threatens the coherence of Aristotle's analysis of substance.

V
Two Objections to the Present Interpretation

After describing two interpretive advantages of the present interpretation, it is appropriate briefly to consider two objections beyond those already discussed in the course of the above analysis. Of those objections already considered perhaps the most significant is the minimal textual support for the description of the concept of a species form, which Aristotle nowhere explicitly defends. It must be reiterated, however, that the objective of the present interpretation is not to argue that Aristotle expressly developed the notion of the species form as a relation of functional identity holding between particular forms, but rather it is to show that this interpretation is consistent with many of his major texts and doctrines, helps render crucial texts and doctrines intelligible, and can be viewed as implied by at least some texts.

One objection to the concept of a species form that has so far not been considered concerns Aristotle's treatment of the categories of substance and relation in the ***Categories***.[19] The objection has two distinct, but related, parts. The first part is based on Aristotle's express treatment in ***Categories*** 7 of the issue of whether substance is relative, i.e. whether it must be explained, like terms that are truly relational, with reference to a correlative, such as when knowledge is explained with reference to the knowable. He unequivocally rejects the notion that primary substance, i.e. the particular individual, is relative, saying, "With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is

[19] The relation between the ***Categories*** and the ***Metaphysics*** is one of the central points of divergence for interpretations of Aristotle's account of substance with some commentators viewing these works as defending inconsistent doctrines while others view them as compatible. Michael Wedin takes the latter approach in ***Aristotle's Theory of Substance***, and yet he nevertheless holds that Aristotle's discussion of secondary substance in the ***Categories*** is, "largely irrelevant to the program of ***Metaphysics*** Z" because the latter "is devoted almost entirely to form and its role in explaining the nature and feature of what the ***Categories*** calls primary substances." (Wedin, p. 121) In contrast, the present interpretation allows the discussion of form in the ***Metaphysics*** to be relevant to and illuminate the analyses of both primary and secondary substances in the ***Categories***.

no such possibility, for neither the wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative." (Aristotle, ***Categories***, 8a15) In addition, although his position and analysis of secondary substance, i.e. of a universal such as a species, is more nuanced than his treatment of primary substance, his general conclusion is that there is also little basis for regarding secondary substance as relative. This conclusion about secondary substances seems to be particularly problematic for the present interpretation since to deny that a secondary substance such as a species is relative seems to preclude regarding the species form as a relation. In addition, it is precisely in the context of this discussion that one would expect Aristotle to describe the conceptual link between 'secondary substance' and the category of relation if he regarded the former as a type of relation. Yet he does not take this opportunity to describe this conceptual link. The second part of the objection rejects as incoherent the concept of the species form as a type of substance based on a relation. The presumed incoherence of this concept arises from Aristotle's recognition in the ***Categories*** of substance and relation as distinct categories. According to this objection, it is impossible, at least on Aristotle's principles, to combine substance and relation coherently into a single concept without destroying the distinction between these categories.

Both parts of this objection initially appear to be problematic for the present interpretation, but it is possible to address both objections fairly easily. First, the appropriate response to the objection that Aristotle expressly rejects the species form as relative in ***Categories*** 7, which implies that the species form cannot be a relation, is that it rests upon a misconception of the type of relation constituting the species form. Aristotle's claim that a secondary substance is not relative entails that it is unnecessary to refer to something ***external*** to a secondary substance in order to explain it, but this does not imply that the secondary substance is not itself best understood as a relation of functional identity holding between members of a species or genus, i.e. it does not imply

that there is not a relation ***internal*** to the concept of a secondary substance.[20] For example, it is unnecessary to refer externally to animals that are not human beings in order to explain 'human being', but the explanation of the latter will nevertheless require indicating the essential characteristics that make human beings functionally identical, which establishes that these beings are in a relation of functional identity. Thus, in light of Aristotle's concern with relations external to secondary substances in ***Categories*** 7, rather than with a relation internal to the concept, one would not expect Aristotle to describe in this context a conceptual link between 'secondary substance' and the category of relation. Secondly, it must, of course, be acknowledged that Aristotle makes a distinction between the categories of substance and relation. However, this implies that the concept of a species form, ***qua*** secondary substance, is incoherent only if that concept completely eradicates the distinction between these two categories. Clearly, however, the concept of a primary substance as a particular individual, whether this individual is a composite or the particular form, is completely untouched by this analysis of the concept of the species form. Thus, the notion of a secondary substance as a unique type of relation does not threaten the overall distinction between the categories of substance and relation. Indeed, as we have seen, explaining the concept of a secondary substance in this manner provides objective, ontological status for universals such as the species without reducing them to a type of primary substance as with Platonic Forms.[21]

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[20] In this context, an external relation is one holding between the members of a species and objects or principles not belonging to the species, and an internal relation is one holding between the members of the species and so is contained in the concept of a species form.

[21] Theodore Scaltsas rejects the notion that the substantial form is a relation and cites both the relevant sections of the ***Categories*** mentioned above and ***Metaphysics Nu*** for textual support for this rejection. However, Scaltsas' denial that substantial form is a relation does not entail rejecting the notion that the species form, construed in the manner above, is a relation. Indeed, what Scaltsas identifies as "substantial form" is precisely what is described by the particular form above, and, as we have seen, the latter is not properly understood as a relation. Thus, Scaltsas' reasons for distinguishing substantial forms from both aggregates and relations can be used to distinguish

A second, distinct objection that was not considered above is the apparent circularity in the preceding account of the species form. It will be recalled that the species form can only be regarded as an object of a definition yielding scientific knowledge if it is a type of substance. But the species form is a type of substance only if it satisfies the criterion of separability by being separate in account, i.e., by being definable without reference to a further, distinct principle. Thus, the objection is that there is a circle because the species form is demonstrated to be the proper object of definition only by being defined in a particular manner.

Admittedly, there is a circle involved in the above analysis, although the circle might be more a function of Aristotle's own treatment of these issues in the ***Metaphysics*** than a product of the present interpretation. Regardless of the source of the circularity, however, the real issue is whether it makes the above analysis question-begging by guaranteeing the result that the species form is a type of substance and thus an object of a definition that yields scientific knowledge. The above analysis would guarantee this result if it produces the same result for any definable thing that is proposed as a candidate for an object of definition. However, it is easy to find a definable counterexample that produces a different result such as Aristotle's familiar example of snubness. In order to be an object of a definition yielding scientific knowledge snubness, like the species form, must satisfy at least one sense of the thisness and separability criteria needed to qualify as substance. However, it is clear that even though 'snubness' can be determinately defined as 'concavity in a nose' it does not thereby satisfy the first sense of the separability criterion by being separate in account. For the definition of 'snubness' must refer to a further, distinct object, i.e. the nose, since it is a concavity specific to that object. Moreover, since snubness is also clearly not separate in existence it does not satisfy the separability criterion of substance, and it thus fails to qualify as substance. Thus, snubness is a counterexample of something definable that fails to qualify

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particular forms from relations as well. See pp. 65-68 of Scaltsas' ***Substances and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics***.

as a substance and as an object of a definition yielding scientific knowledge. As a result, the circularity of the preceding analysis is not question-begging since it does not guarantee the result that the species form qualifies as substance.

VI
Conclusion

It is doubtful that any interpretation of Aristotle's treatment of the concept of form in the ***Metaphysics*** can completely unravel the tangled nest of issues, complexities, and problems it contains, and the present interpretation is certainly no exception especially in light of its format as a short paper. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the foregoing discussion illuminates some of the basic concepts, doctrines, and texts surrounding Aristotle's discussion of form and renders them more intelligible and consistent than they are often taken to be by Aristotle's commentators and critics.

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What Was Hume's Problem about Personal Identity in the Appendix?

Megan Blomfield

Hume's theory of personal identity is the one thing in which he confesses to having made "considerable mistakes" in the Appendix to the ***Treatise (App. 1)***. There is little consensus, however, on what exactly was the source of his discontent. There is not time in this paper to discuss the multitude of opinions that have been given on the Appendix, but in what follows I will explain what I think was troubling Hume. I think that Hume finds that his explanation of how we attribute simplicity and identity to our minds fails once we are aware that the mind is a bundle of all our perceptions. I will then briefly discuss Pitson's criticism of this sort of interpretation, concluding that Pitson's objections are unsuccessful.

Hume's bundle theory of the mind

Hume's theory of mind essentially states that the mind is a bundle of perceptions. It is important, therefore, to understand exactly what perceptions are according to Hume. Perceptions are all that is present to the mind, whether sensing, thinking, reflecting or "actuated with passions" ***(Ab. 5)***. They are separated into impressions and ideas, which differ in terms of degree of "force and liveliness" ***(T, 1.1.1.1)***. Impressions are those perceptions that have most "force and violence", whereas ideas are the fainter perceptions we have whenever we reflect on other perceptions. I think that Hume seems to take an action theory of perceptions, in which they have an awareness of their objects built into them – a perception isn't an image, rather it is an awareness of an image. Since a perception of a perception[1] is an awareness of a perception, to become aware of a perception is for an idea of it to occur. You are not aware of your perceptions unless you reflect upon them.

[1] What I will call a "reflective perception."

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Hume delivers his account of personal identity in ***Treatise*** 1.4.6. In the previous section, he has rejected the Ancient Philosophy's posit of a mental substance, or soul, in which the perceptions of the mind are said to inhere, and has argued that, in fact, each perception fits the definition of substance as "***something which may exist by itself***". Each perception is different, and therefore distinguishable, from every other perception (and everything else in the universe). The imagination can therefore separate each perception from everything else and conceive it as separately existent. Hume concludes from this that each perception is in need of nothing at all - nothing such as a mental substance – to support its existence, but "may exist separately" from everything else in the universe ***(T, 1.4.5.5)***.

In 1.4.6, Hume begins by challenging philosophers who believe in the ubiquity of self-consciousness: who hold that we have a constant awareness of the existence of a perfectly simple and identical self. Hume asserts that, when "I enter most intimately into what I call ***myself***" ***(T, 1.4.6.3)*** he can never catch himself without a perception, and never observes anything ***but*** perceptions which are in permanent flux. There is no constant and invariable impression that would suffice to give rise to the idea of a simple and identical self. Hume argues that really we have no notion of self[2] distinct from our particular perceptions, and that the mind is therefore nothing but a bundle of perceptions, just like bodies are nothing but bundles of qualities. "There is no ***simplicity*** in [the mind] at one time, nor ***identity*** in different; whatever natural propension we might have to imagine that simplicity and identity" ***(T, 1.4.6.4)***.

What remains, therefore, is for Hume to explain this "natural propension" to ascribe simplicity and identity to the different perceptions which constitute the mind; how it is that we form this idea of the simplicity and identity of a self, given that it cannot be derived from a simple impression ***(T,1.4.6.5)***. Hume attempts to do this analogously to the way he explains the origin of our mistaken idea of the distinct and continued existence of bodies in

[2] Or mind. I think Hume uses 'mind' and 'self' interchangeably, and I will do likewise.

1.4.2 – the idea results from the operation of our imagination upon our perceptions. Identity, for Hume, is the idea of an object that is uninterrupted and invariable over time. We are wont, however, to confuse the idea of identity with that of a succession of different objects connected by a close relation ***(T, 1.4.6.6)***, because our imagination has a natural and unavoidable tendency to attribute identity to the closely related objects. Hume thinks this is what takes place whenever we ascribe identity to an object which isn't in fact unvaried and uninterrupted ***(T, 1.4.6.7)***.

Therefore, since our perceptions are in reality distinct existences, we can only attribute the quality of identity to them because when we reflect upon them our ideas of them are given a "union in the imagination" ***(T, 1.4.6.16)***. The ideas are given such a union by virtue of the universal principles that guide the imagination: the associative principles of resemblance and causation (Hume rejects contiguity). These principles give rise to passive general patterns that the mind wanders in accordance with, producing an easy transition of ideas. There are relations of resemblance between our past perceptions and the images we form of them in memory ***(T,1.4.6.18)***, and relations of causation between our perceptions because they constitute the mind as a system in which they produce and destroy each other – impressions give rise to ideas which in turn give rise to further impressions ***(T,1.4.6.19)***. Our notion of personal identity therefore arises solely from the "smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of…ideas", due to the relations of causation and resemblance between the perceptions that the ideas are reflective perceptions of. This smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought ***feels*** almost the same as perceiving one unvaried and continuing object – it ***feels*** as though the perceptions are connected by the relation of identity. This is why we attribute identity to our perceptions, even though it is really a "mistake" to do so ***(T, 1.4.6.6)***.

To justify mistaken attributions of identity, we often invent some "new and unintelligible principle" that connects the objects together ***(T, 1.4.6.6)***. This can be seen in the Ancient Philosophy's posit of an underlying substance to connect the bundle of qualities that constitutes an external body, as discussed in

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1.4.3. This is what Hume thinks is taking place when philosophers posit the existence of a "soul" or underlying mental "substance". Since, as stated in 1.4.5.5, each perception is a distinct existence which can be considered separately from all other perceptions without contradiction or "absurdity" ***(T, 1.4.2.39)***, we never ***actually*** perceive a "real connexion" between them[3] ***(T, 1.4.6.16)***. The positing by philosophers of an underlying "self" or "substance" which connects our perceptions is therefore seen to be a "fiction".

The Appendix

In the Appendix, Hume refers back to his account of personal identity with unease. He now claims that he is caught in a "labyrinth" that leaves him the victim of sceptical doubts ***(App.10)***. "In short", he says, the problem results from two principles that he claims unable to reject or render consistent ***(App.21)***:

> **P1** "All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences."
>
> **P2** "The mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences."

These principles, however, are not inconsistent with each other[4]. In fact, together they entail that:

> **P3** The mind never perceives any real connection among our distinct perceptions.

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[3] By 'real connection' Hume seems to mean: "a connection between two objects such that the existence of one entails or is impossible without the existence of the other." ***(Garrett, 350).***

[4] A point "on which all seem to agree." ***(Waxman, 1992, 234).***

This strange claim of Hume's, and his failure to explain clearly what was troubling him in the Appendix, has led to many interpretations of what his worry could have been. I think that it is important to look very closely at what else Hume says in the Appendix to try and figure out what his problem really was.

Just previously ***(App.20)***, Hume has stated that P1 entails that:

> **P4** Our perceptions "form a whole only by being connected together."

It is P3 and P4 which I think give rise to the contradiction that Hume is worried about. Our perceptions ***do*** "form a whole" – they form a bundle to which we attribute simplicity and identity – so they must ***somehow*** be "connected together". However, given P3, "no [real] connexions among [our distinct perceptions] are ever discoverable by human understanding". Hume therefore, in his account of personal identity, had to find another way to explain how it is that our perceptions are "connected together", involving the way in which we "***feel*** a connexion" between our ***ideas*** of them. I think that Hume has discovered that the very explanation he gives to this effect defeats itself. In what follows I will explain how.

In his discussion in the Appendix, Hume begins by recounting his theory of personal identity with approval. He restates his denial of the "strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being" ***(App. 10)***, reiterating arguments to support both his claim that all perceptions are distinct existences, and that the self is nothing but a bundle of these perceptions. He clearly retains his belief that the attribution of simplicity and identity to the perceptions in the bundle that constitutes the mind is a mistake.

It is only now, "having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions", that Hume announces his difficulty: "when I proceed to explain the principle of connection[89], which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible that my account is very defective" ***(App. 20)***. Hume here (89) refers us back to the point around 1.4.6.16 where he claims

that the associative principles of resemblance and causation must be the origin of our mistaken idea of a simple and identical self, and begins to explain how this could be the case. It appears to be something to do with the associative principles or the task he has assigned them that is therefore the problem. Now, I don't think that it is the associative principles themselves that Hume is dissatisfied with. In the Abstract to the ***Treatise*** he insists that the principles of association are what, if anything, "can entitle the author to so glorious a name as that of an inventor" ***(Ab. 35)***. The principles of association are crucial to his entire project, and Hume's use of them "enters into most of his philosophy". If there was a problem with the principles themselves, then it seems unlikely that Hume would have confined his worries in the Appendix to his theory of personal identity. It must rather be the application of the principles to this particular problem that is "defective".

Hume then repeats with satisfaction his claim that "the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other", asserting that "the present philosophy has…so far a promising aspect" ***(App. 20)***. However, he continues, "all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, that gives me satisfaction on this head". Consciousness, Hume has just described as a "reflected thought or perception"; and it is thought which, he has just claimed, "alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions". So, given Hume is worried about successive perceptions "in our thought or consciousness", I think that his problem is clearly something to do with the reflective perceptions that we have when our imagination forms its mistaken attributions of identity[5].

[5] Waxman also thinks this phrase ("our thought or consciousness") seems likely to refer to the "associative imagination" rather than the mind itself ***(1992, 23***6), although he takes a different view as to what this implies is Hume's main problem in the Appendix.

This is how I think reflective perceptions of thought cause a problem for Hume: At 1.4.6.18, around the point which Hume refers us back to, he explains how it is that relations of resemblance between perceptions contribute to our attribution of identity to them, by talking about what we would observe if we were to look at the bundle of perceptions which constitutes the mind of ***another*** person. Hume argues that the relations of resemblance that are bound to hold between the person's memory perceptions and the lower order perceptions which they are images of, will lead to the easy transition of ***our*** imagination along ***our*** ideas when we reflect on the ***other*** person's perceptions. He then claims that "the case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others". The case is ***not*** the same, however; for when we reflect upon the bundle of perceptions that constitute our ***own*** minds, we ***add*** perceptions to the bundle. To reflect – in thought or consciousness – on our own perceptions is to form ideas of them, and these ideas, which are also perceptions, are also members of the bundle that constitutes our mind.

Now, this isn't a problem for explaining the vulgar's mistaken idea of the simplicity and identity of their minds, because the vulgar aren't aware of themselves as bundles of perceptions. The vulgar simply attribute simplicity and identity to their perceptions when they reflect on them in memory, without being aware of the reflective perceptions to which they are giving a union in their imagination. When philosophising, however, we become ***aware*** that the mind to which we attribute simplicity and identity is a bundle of perceptions that is "[the same with] ***all*** particular perceptions; [including those of] thought" *(**App.17,*** my italics*)*. We also become aware of the existence of the ***ideas*** we form of our perceptions when reflecting on them to make our vulgar attributions of identity. We must therefore find a way of explaining how it is that we attribute simplicity and identity to ***these*** ideas – or reflective perceptions – and ***this*** is what Hume's account involving the associative principles is unable to do.

The mind cannot perceive any real connection between these reflective perceptions and the other perceptions that constitute our minds. Therefore, since they are nevertheless a part of the bundle to which we attribute simplicity and

identity, it must ***feel*** a connection between ideas of them. But this involves the mind reflecting upon these reflective perceptions, resulting in ideas or perceptions of an ***even higher*** order whose presence in the bundle we must also somehow account for. There will always be some remainder, some perceptions whose presence in the bundle Hume cannot account for. In giving his explanation of how the bundle of perceptions which constitutes a mind forms a whole, he defeats that very explanation – for the bundle he is trying to account for is no longer the whole bundle. This, I think, is Hume's problem in the Appendix.

This interpretation of Hume's worry explains why he cannot render the two principles consistent (since they necessitate his development of an explanation which defeats itself), and also explains why he thinks that the problem could be solved if ***(App.21)***:

> **S1** Our perceptions "[inhered] in something simple and individual."

> **S2** "The mind [perceived] any real connection" among our perceptions.

If either of these were the case, then Hume would not have to find an explanation for how our perceptions form a connected whole which involved ***feeling*** connections between ideas of them. It is this explanation that leads Hume into a labyrinth. This also explains why it is that the problem Hume discusses in the Appendix seems to be fairly isolated. Normally, our mistaken idea of personal identity arises easily from our natural reflection on past and present perceptions in memory and thought. It is only when investigating this process, and thinking about the mistaken idea of the simplicity and identity of the mind given an ***awareness*** of it as a bundle of perceptions that Hume encounters a contradiction.

Pitson's problem with this sort of interpretation

My view of the problem in the Appendix is very similar to the interpretation given by Ainslie ***(Ainslie, 2001)***. Pitson argues against Ainslie's view, which he thinks is only plausible "given that one accepts the crucial claim that the beliefs for which Hume is trying to account in T, 1.4.6 are the product of philosophical reflection" ***(Pitson, 76-77)***. The problem of reflective perceptions only arises for "philosophical perspectives" on the belief in the simplicity and identity of the self as a bundle of perceptions. The vulgar do not reflect on themselves as bundles of perceptions, so Hume does not need to account for the inclusion of reflective perceptions in their mistaken ideas of a simple and identical mind. Pitson therefore concludes that this cannot be the contradiction Hume is referring to, because his discussion of personal identity in 1.4.6 and the Appendix concerns only the beliefs of the vulgar ***(Ibid., 79)***.

Pitson also argues that the appropriation into the bundle of reflective perceptions would only pose a problem for our attributions of synchronic unity, and since Hume refers in the Appendix to the trouble in accounting for the identity ascribed to ***successive*** perceptions in thought or consciousness ***(App.20)***, this cannot be the problem Hume is concerned with.

I think, in accordance with Pitson[6], that Hume is trying to account for the "natural propension" *(T, 1.4.6.4)* of the vulgar (and philosophers) to believe in the simplicity and identity of the mind in 1.4.6. I also agree with Pitson that the interpretation I give of the Appendix doesn't cause problems for Hume's explanation of the origin of the vulgar's mistaken ideas about personal identity. However, I think that it is Hume's *philosophical explanation* of this belief that he is struggling with in the Appendix. I do not think Pitson gives any convincing reason why Hume's discussion in the Appendix should be confined to the beliefs of the vulgar. In fact, I think that if Hume is concerned with the philosophical perspective in the Appendix this would explain why he retains his satisfaction with his assertion that "the thought alone finds personal identity,

[6] And with Penhelum (107), but supposedly contrary to Ainslie.

when reflecting on the train of past perceptions". It is only once he comes to explain how we continue to attribute simplicity and identity to the mind ***given the awareness*** that it is a bundle of perceptions that the difficulty arises. This is one of the reasons why Hume's problem seems fairly isolated even within his account of personal identity.

Similarly, I disagree that this interpretation fails because Hume states his problem concerns "successive" perceptions. I think that it is simply the case that, for Hume, the ascription of diachronic and synchronic unity to the perceptions constituting a mind is a temporal process – it is a judgement that takes place over time. We form our mistaken ideas of personal identity when reflecting on our perceptions in a "smooth and uninterrupted" ***train*** of thought or ideas ***(T, 1.4.6.16)***. There are, therefore, a series of perceptions that Hume cannot appropriate into the bundle. ***This*** is why Hume says that it is the ***successive*** perceptions in our "thought or consciousness" that he has difficulty explaining. The problem is not necessarily confined to an attribution of synchronic unity. The attribution of simplicity to our perceptions might – in fact I think probably does – pose more of a problem for Hume than does the attribution of identity, but he doesn't indicate that this is his particular problem in the Appendix. In fact the mistaken idea of the simplicity of the mind seems to be somewhat neglected in the Appendix – as it is in 1.4.6. The particular problem is the successive reflective perceptions involved in our vulgar attributions of identity and simplicity. Whether the problem they pose is confined to explaining our mistaken attributions of diachronic or synchronic unity is another question. Therefore I think Pitson fails to give any conclusive argument against this interpretation of the Appendix.

Conclusion

I have explained, and briefly defended, what I think Hume's problem is in the Appendix to the ***Treatise***. I think that this interpretation fits with what Hume

says in the Appendix, and makes sense as to why the problem he refers to is isolated to, and even within, his discussion of personal identity – why he doesn't seem to think it causes problems for his reasoning in the rest of the ***Treatise***, or even for how it is that "the thought…finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind". It is only in his philosophical reasoning – when actually considering such an act of thought – that Hume runs into trouble.

Hume concludes that "if this be not a good general reason for scepticism, 'tis at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supply'd) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions" ***(App.10)*****.** Hume's empiricism allows him to plead the "privilege of a sceptic" and announce the problem of explaining our philosophical attribution of simplicity and identity to our perceptions "too hard for my understanding" ***(App.21)***. Our natural propension to think ourselves possessed of a simple and identical mind remains, however – whether aware of ourselves as bundles of perceptions or not – and Hume therefore leaves us with yet another example of "the tendency for human nature to generate beliefs that cannot be shaken by sceptical arguments, but are not open to justification by metaphysical constructions either" ***(Penhelum, 42)***.

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What Was Hume's Problem about Personal Identity in the Appendix?

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The Effect of Luck on Morality

Kerian Wallace

In his work ***Moral Luck*** Thomas Nagel suggests that morality is determined by luck. He argues that it affects not only society's evaluation of an act but also ones ability to be moral. He is correct in recognizing that an agent is not always fully responsible for the consequences of their actions; however he understates the value society places on intention. A person's moral capacity is a matter of chance, as natural characteristics are not chosen by an agent. Luck is an important consideration when evaluating the morality of both the action and the person themselves, but determining how much responsibility may be placed on destiny is difficult. If we allow for luck to account for too much than no one may be praised or criticized for their actions; however if not enough value is given to luck then it seems we unfairly evaluate persons based on factors beyond their control. Nagel is right to suggest that some factors affecting a person's ability to be moral are a matter of fate.

Nagel draws upon Kant's theory of morality to demonstrate the importance of intention when evaluating an acts morality. By only considering an agent's motives his system does not allow for any factors of luck to interfere with the moral assessment. This eliminates any discrepancies that may occur between a person's objectives and what actually happens.[1] Using the legal system as an example Nagel argues that society does not follow a Kantian system:

> If someone has had too much to drink and his car swerves onto the sidewalk, he can count himself morally lucky if there are no pedestrians in his path. If there were, he would be to blame for their deaths, and would probably be prosecuted for manslaughter. But if he hurts no one, although his recklessness is exactly the same, he is guilty of a far less serious legal offence and will

[1] Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck" in Pojman, ***Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings,*** California: Wadsworth, 2007, p. 295.

> certainly reproach himself and be reproached by others much less severely.[2]

It is true that this is a case of moral luck, but this example gives an inadequate reflection of society's feelings towards intention. It is not feasible that the law implement such a system. The law must look beyond intention when punishing the wrongdoer. People may not be held accountable for events that could have happened. In this example it cannot be proven that had someone been on the sidewalk the driver would not have swerved, applied the brakes, or done anything else to prevent the accident. It would seem odd if the legal system had the power to punish for things that could have happened. Therefore the drunk driver who does not harm anyone may only be reprimanded for the act of driving while impaired since the potential results of this action are difficult to prove. Though the charge for impaired driving is not as great as manslaughter it demonstrates that society views this as an unethical act. The law puts more value on intention than Nagel has accounted for.

Society's value for intentions can also be seen by the treatment of actions that occur outside the legal realm. Nagel believes that "there is a morally significant difference between rescuing someone from a burning building and dropping him from a twelfth-story window while trying to rescue him."[3] But this is not always the case, sometimes a judgment is formed regardless of the end result. This can be demonstrated by the Canadian hero Terry Fox. Despite the fact that he did not meet his goals, there is no cure for cancer and he did not complete his Marathon of Hope, Fox was still recognized as one of the top ten greatest Canadians of all time.[4] When thinking of Fox it is not his lack of accomplishments but his spirit and intentions that are remembered. It can be assumed that if the person in Nagel's example had taken a reasonable amount of

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[2] Nagel, 297.

[3] Nagel, 296.

[4] CBC/Radio Canada, "Top Ten Greatest Canadians: Terry Fox," <http://www.cbc.ca/greatest/top_ten/nominee/fox-terry.html>.

care people would view the misfortune as the fault of the fire and praise him for his effort. If the rescuer was careless and clumsy he would be held partly responsible for the death. This moral blame is not because of his failure but comes as a result of his acting carelessly. If the amount of care given was beyond the agent's control the situation would be assessed differently. This is why in law a reasonable and prudent person is held to different standards than infants and those who lack the mental capacity to make informed decisions. It is true that the person who fails to complete the rescue is likely given less praise than the person who is successful, but this does not mean that intentions go unnoticed. A failed rescue is at times due to luck, and where this can be shown he will be viewed just as moral as the successful rescuer. But often a failed rescue is a sign of carelessness or another factor that may not be attributed to luck. Regardless of an acts consequence, value will be given to an agent's intentions where it is reasonable to do so.

Nagel separates luck into different categories, one of which is circumstances. These are factors that pertain to the type of situations one is faced with.[5] Situational factors are often beyond the control of the individual. In order to assess someone's morality they must be faced with a moral dilemma. The most immoral person may go unnoticed if they are never required to make an ethical decision. Whether or not an agent faces such dilemmas is a matter of luck. Consider two children who by chance are born into different families. The first child is raised in an affluent family and is given support emotionally and financially from his parents. As a result he becomes a good moral agent and lives a virtuous life. The other child is raised in lower income housing and receives less support from his family. As a result he joins a gang to gain a sense of belonging and becomes involved in various immoral acts. Here it may be said that social inequalities lead to situational differences, which had an effect on each child's development as a moral agent. The delinquent will be viewed as immoral since he chose to behave unethically, despite the fact that his socioeconomic status was a contributing factor in his behavior. It is difficult to

[5] Nagel, 297.

decide what should be done to compensate for this bad luck. In one regard it is unfair to hold the delinquent to the same standards as the child who seems to have had an easier path, yet to give the delinquent special treatment undermines the good behavior of the virtuous child. To treat the children differently assumes that given the same situation both children would react in the same manner, but the behavior of any agent in a given circumstance is impossible to predict. The situations we are presented with affect our ability to demonstrate how ethical we are, still luck is what determines whether or not any moral predicaments arise.

There are certain aspects of a person's character that affect their ability to be moral. To use the same example as stated above, a child dealing with the same sociological factors as the delinquent may not be lead into an immoral life. There are many children who lack financial and sociological support that do not engage in immoral behaviors. The psychological factors that affect ones ability to make good moral choices are what Nagel refers to as constitutive luck. These are traits that pertain to an individual's inclinations, capacities and temperament.[6] Given the same situation people will differ in their capability to make the right decision, this capacity is acquired by chance. Consider a married man who is unhappy with his marriage and is given the opportunity to date an attractive female. He finds himself in an ethical dilemma; he may act adulterously or remain faithful to his wife. If he cheats on his wife this could be considered a psychological problem, he is said to lack virtues such as patience, honesty and commitment. His adulterous ways are not his fault, for he did not choose to lack the character traits necessary to stay committed to his wife. These virtues are instilled at birth and thus are the result of luck. Upon the discovery of her husband's actions his wife would most likely not accept an explanation that applied constitutive luck and call him unethical, among other names. Nagel is right to suggest that character traits are a matter of fate but it is hard to determine which behaviors are a result of innate traits and those that result from choice.

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[6] ***Ibid***.

It is easier to accept circumstantial luck since situations are regarded as external influences. Because constitutive luck pertains to character traits which are internal it seems odd to think that a mental cause for action is beyond an agent's control. If this type of luck is accepted then deciding what an individual is responsible for becomes problematic. If luck is to account for every act then no one is morally responsible for their actions. In such a world a good moral agent is not a status that is earned but is bestowed upon the lucky who are fortunate to possess the proper character traits. This takes away from the meaningfulness of living an honorable life since our morality is predetermined and cannot be changed despite our greatest efforts. If not enough is attributed to luck then it seems unfair to hold some agents accountable for things beyond their control. It appears the more we attribute to luck the less we can give to the individual. The solution to this moral dilemma cannot easily be realized.

Nagel underestimates the value society places on an agent's intentions but is right to incorporate luck into a person's ability to be moral. Psychological traits may influence a person's capacity to act morally. These traits are not chosen by the agent, thus their acquisition can be regarded as a matter of luck. When society evaluates the morality of both a person and an act it is hard to determine how much should be accredited to chance. Although people try to focus solely on intentions factors concerning constitutive and circumstantial luck are difficult to account for. We do not live in a Kantian society because it would be impossible for such a system to function. For every action that we attribute to fate we take away from the responsibility of the individual. Though it is correct to acknowledge luck when evaluating the morality of both an act and an individual it is difficult to determine which external factors are matters of fate.

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Love as Knowledge: the Metaphysics behind the Emotion

Matt Schuler

What is the nature of love between human persons? In attempting to answer this question, a particularly fruitful approach is to identify competing paradigms that emphasize various aspects of the concept. Thus, for example, both Martha Nussbaum and Vincent Brümmer ask whether love is fundamentally an emotion, an attitude, or a relation. Although I believe that the emotional, attitudinal, and relational aspects of love are important, in this essay I will argue that love is principally a ***form of knowledge***. It is my belief that, together, the love-as-emotion model and the love-as-knowledge model virtually exhaust the discourse and account for the vast majority of what is necessary to the concept of love; further, an analysis of these two paradigms will show, I hope, that primacy ought to be given to the love-as-knowledge model. In short, I will argue that love is first and foremost a form of knowledge, and that this knowledge is what triggers and informs the emotion of love. But before delving into the positive content of love, I would like to turn briefly to the topic of what love is ***not***.

I

This essay is concerned principally with love between human persons. Nonetheless, it will be useful to make some general remarks concerning the appropriateness of our use of the term "love" in certain other circumstances. This will set some preliminary restrictions on our project that will be of particular importance in part III of this essay.

It is customary to begin by noting—and often marveling at—the extraordinary diversity of the ***objects*** of our love: there is romantic love, love of God, one's children, one's country, various activities, and so forth. It is often remarked by philosophers confronting this fact that what is needed is an account of love capable of accommodating such disparate forms as those mentioned. This, in turn, often takes the form of identifying the common denominator of

every variety of love. Thus Robert Nozick proposes that "what is common to all love is... [that] your own well-being is tied up with that of someone (or something) you love."[1] In a sense it would be difficult to disagree with this formulation, but our intuition is that love is more complicated than that. Accordingly, the reductionism that gives rise to this sort of solution ought to arouse suspicion. Putting such dissimilar objects on an emotional par and then searching for the lowest common denominator shrinks down the concept we hope to elucidate to a bare and conceptually impoverished axiomatics.

Thus, I suggest that the question, "What do love of football and love for a human person have in common?" should be neither asked nor answered. There simply is no philosophically significant common denominator. I think it can be safely claimed that when we talk about ***loving*** football or Chinese food we are only being linguistically lazy. (It would certainly be strange, after all, to insist that one has the relevant ***emotions*** concerning a particular cuisine.) Accordingly, we want to be able to dismiss outright as unlikely candidates for the status of "beloved" whatever class of objects includes football and Chinese food. But where is the line drawn? Part of the answer is found in Aristotle, who removes from his consideration "lifeless objects" on account of their inability to reciprocate. But if this were our sole criterion, we might be stuck dismissing such things as love for humanity and love of God (insofar as He is "lifeless" in a corporeal sense) before giving them their due consideration. Although there are a multitude of epistemic and relational questions that arise when a person asserts that she loves God, there appears to be more substance to her statement than there might have been had she instead proclaimed her love for her favorite television show. For present purposes, then, allow the following to suffice. If a person's affection for a "lifeless object" is ***prima facie better explained*** by some other affective category, let that person's love-claims be evaluated under ***that*** rubric rather than the one we are concerned with here. I think we will often find that, rather than ***love***, the more appropriate category is "fondness." In his ***Emotions***, Robert C. Roberts shows that to be fond of something is to "prefer it,

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[1] ***The Examined Life***, p. 68.

to be disposed to enjoy it, but in a sort of aesthetic way."[2] Importantly, he points out that although fondness can be the "basis" for emotions, it is not an emotion itself.[3] I think Roberts is right about this. And if it is conceded that whatever one feels about Chinese food, it is decidedly not a feeling with ***emotional content*** (but is rather something more appropriately characterized in terms of the appetitive), then it would make good sense to interpret "I love Chinese food" as "I am extremely fond of Chinese food," and in the process sidestep the problem of fitting exceedingly divergent affections under the same general heading.[4]

Perhaps this is an uncontroversial suggestion, but its significance in connection with what follows cannot be understated. Let us turn, then, to a somewhat brief discussion of the love-as-emotion model.

II

Here the important question to ask is, of course, whether love generally adheres to the requisite features of emotions. Whereas Solomon asserts, without argument, that "love is an emotion, nothing else,"[5] others, such as Roberts, recognize the possibility that love differs in an important sense from other emotions. It may even differ so much that it makes sense to call love an emotion only insofar as it predisposes us to a host of (other) emotions (***proper***).[6] The view that love is a form of attachment that engenders a wide variety of emotions (rather than an emotion in its own right) is supported by the following

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[2] ***Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology***, p. 296.

[3] ***Ibid***., p. 297.

[4] Of course, it would not be reasonable—nor would it be desirable—to suggest that in ordinary discourse we restrict our use of the word "love" in this manner. Such a move would do violence to ordinary language. Rather, the point is that certain attachments we are inclined to call love are better explained otherwise; if they are ***not*** explained otherwise, they threaten to confound any understanding afforded by a conceptual analysis of love.

[5] ***Love: Emotion, Myth, and Metaphor,*** p. 34.

[6] ***Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology***, p. 288.

observations: unlike an emotion, love is (1) dispositional, and (2) involves a perception not of the "local and episodic circumstances of the object" of the emotion, but rather of the "enduring predicates of the object herself [himself, itself]."[7] This is an attractive move, as it addresses the fact that, peculiar among the emotions, love can make us feel joy, anger, sadness, et cetera. At least in terms of degree, the same cannot be said for joy, anger, and sadness ***themselves***. Should love, then, be considered an emotion? Perhaps a more systematic examination will allow us to determine the extent to which it can be properly understood as such.

Certain features seem necessary to the concept of an emotion. It should be possible, then, to determine which affective phenomena ought to be considered emotional in nature and which ought not to be. Roberts provides an inventory of such features, some of which are listed here as minimal criteria for inclusion in the catalogue of emotions: (1) emotions are "paradigmatically felt" but may occur "independently of the corresponding feeling"; (2) emotions are often accompanied by physiological changes which are sometimes felt; (3) paradigm cases of emotions "take objects"; (4) the objects emotions take are "typically situational"; (5) ordinarily the subject of an emotion "believes the propositional content of his emotion"; (6) it is possible to have emotions "without being able to articulate (all of) their content," some of which may be nonpropositional; (7) it is sometimes possible to "exercise voluntary control" over a given emotion, and sometimes not.[8]

Love has little difficulty satisfying these conditions. The first three are met with ease. Concerning the fourth, it should be pointed out that, in describing an object as typically "situational," Roberts intends to capture that an emotion is often not directed only at, say, a particular person, but also for a given ***reason***, and against the backdrop of a particular ***setting***. With respect to the three remaining criteria, I think it would be difficult to develop a theory of love that would have trouble meeting them.

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[7] ***Ibid***.

[8] ***Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology***, pp. 60-64.

But although love fits comfortably within this rubric, the question I will address in part III below is whether ***any*** set of requirements exclusively in the domain of the emotions adequately captures the essence of love. It may be that love satisfies a given set of requirements without being appropriately ***defined*** by them.[9] Since it is clear, however, that there is at least an emotional ***component*** involved in love, we will want to account for love's possession of features that distinguish it in a significant sense from other emotions. How might we flesh out the ***specifically emotional*** content of love? We might begin, as others often do, by observing that as a feeling or an emotion, love is typically contrasted with hate. This approach is promising, since identifying its opposite might help us come closer to isolating love's essential features. But the fact of the matter is that, although love involves a bestowal of positive value on its object and hate involves a bestowal of negative value, these two emotions are at bottom more similar than they are dissimilar. Importantly, both involve passionate interestedness. One cannot be indifferent toward someone and also hate him; neither can he be indifferent toward someone and also love him. Indifference is therefore more destructive to both concepts than either is to the other. For this reason, I think it is appropriate to regard love as opposed to indifference, as empathy is opposed to apathy.

It does not seem, however, that indifference is an emotion and so it might be thought that, insofar as love ***is*** an emotion, there must be some significant conceptual asymmetry between the two. This difficulty provides the opportunity to bring to light a feature of the love-as-emotion model that we have neglected so far. Indifference, it seems, is an ***attitude***. It is a way of addressing

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[9] It would not be unlike defining man as "merely" a mammal: it is ***true*** that he is a mammal, but man has certain features (e.g., reason, the capacity for moral deliberation, etc.) that allow him to fall squarely within that classification without it actually exhausting the meaning of "man." And if the question were, "What is man?" it would be telling a half-truth to allow any conceivable "mammal criteria" to serve as a complete answer. Likewise it is necessary, although not sufficient, to define love as an emotion—or rather, as having an emotional component. But in order to exhaust the meaning of the term, we need a more robust taxonomy, one that rests comfortably not at class or order but rather at genus or species.

the world and particular people. If love is to be contrasted with indifference, then, it must have some stock in the attitudinal sphere. And indeed it does. Just as a person is capable of regarding others and the world either empathetically or apathetically, so too is she capable of regarding them either lovingly or indifferently. Love, as an attitude, is an individual's psychological or behavioral projection of certain emotions onto the world and others with the effect that the individual regards those things lovingly. An attitude of love, therefore, requires the emotion of love (or, more precisely, the variety of emotions it disposes us toward) for its formation; it is a ***turning outward*** of one's internal states, a ***regarding*** or ***projecting***.

On the model of love I am advocating, what has been said thus far should be an adequate sketch of the sense in which love is an emotion and an attitude. Perhaps it has occurred to the reader that although it is appropriate to regard love as something that disposes us toward a range of emotions, there are ways in which the emotion model inevitably fails to capture the essence of love. This essence—as I will endeavor to show presently—is constituted primarily by epistemic considerations that fill in the gaps left by the emotion model.

III

In this section, I hope to provide a foundation for the paradigm discussed above. The view I want to advance is that regarding love as an emotion is appropriate, provided that we consider the emotion to be ultimately a ***response***. What it is a response ***to*** is, of course, the subject of this section. My claim is that love, the emotion, issues from a unique kind of knowledge of the beloved. This knowledge is a ***seeing*** or ***perceiving,*** a privileged insight into the essential truth of the beloved.

It is commonly assumed that the etiology of love is best explained as the recognition of value in some object. (Call this the value hypothesis.) Something like this has to be right or else we risk leaving unexplained what motivates us to love one person rather than another. The value hypothesis is not,

however, immune to difficulties. Emphasizing the role that specific valuable traits or qualities play in our love of persons puts in jeopardy our ability to explain why we are committed to loving certain people and not others when those others possess precisely the ***same*** valuable properties as those we do love. In short, it undermines our notion of the beloved as an irreplaceable individual. This criticism is often leveled against the cold, inhuman landscape of Platonic ***eros***. A clear implication of that theory is that as soon as the beloved ceases to exhibit the valuable properties that warrant my love, she ceases to be a suitable object of it. She is an object of my love in the first place only because, in loving those properties, I can ascend to the more noble and lofty love of Goodness and Beauty. As Vlastos, Brümmer, and many others have pointed out, Plato's view requires that we not "love persons for their own sakes but only to the extent that they instantiate or realize ideals or contribute to the realization of ideals."[10] But in fact,

> Plato got the matter reversed...as love grows you love not general aspects or traits but more and more particular ones, not intelligence in general but that particular mind, not kindness in general but those particular ways of being kind.[11]

For this reason we ought to agree not with Socrates but with the ***Symposium***'s Alcibiades. In her sympathetic portrayal of him, Nussbaum speaks of Alcibiades's "deep desire to know Socrates," as well as his "desire to be known"; Alcibiades wants to "open up the other," an "epistemic" desire to "know everything that he [Socrates] was."[12] According to Nussbaum, Alcibiades suggests in his speech that "the lover's knowledge of the particular other, gained through an intimacy both bodily and intellectual, is itself a unique and uniquely valuable ***kind*** of [knowledge]."[13] This form of knowledge, which

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[10] ***The Model of Love***, p. 113.
[11] ***The Examined Life***, p. 81.
[12] ***The Fragility of Goodness***, p. 189.
[13] ***Ibid***., p. 190.

stands in contrast to the form of knowledge Socrates supports (viz., the discovery of universal truths), closely resembles the form I will develop here:

> The lover's understanding, attained through the supple interaction of sense, emotion, and intellect...yields particular truths and particular judgments. [Alcibiades's] knowledge sees more [than Socrates's], and differently; it is an integrated response to the person as a unique whole.14

This statement, which references (1) the uniqueness or irreplaceability of the beloved and (2) our love for the wholeness of the beloved, embodies in concise form a robust resistance to the logic that takes the value hypothesis too far. As mentioned above, the value hypothesis threatens the doctrine of irreplaceability. The second and related difficulty is that the Platonic emphasis on value stands in direct conflict with the view that, as Tolstoy put it, "when you love someone, you love the whole person." To be loved for one's entirety is to be loved for oneself, rather than for any peripheral or unessential features of one's identity. I would suggest that, in turn, to be loved "for oneself" almost requires that the lover not be able to enumerate various valuable properties of the beloved responsible for his love; something with permanence at the beloved's core is what sustains the lover's love throughout myriad changes in physical appearance, personality, and identity more broadly.

What is the nature of this "something with permanence at the beloved's core?" I think this question can be answered by examining an interpretation of Plato offered by Norton and Kille that renders his theory of love compatible with both love of "the whole person," and with the view that the beloved is an irreplaceable individual rather than merely a "dispensable placeholder for ideals."[15] Their account centers on a discussion of the concept of a ***daimon***. (It is important to note that in the present use of this term, we are not referring to

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[14] ***Ibid***., pp. 190-191, italics mine.

[15] ***The Model of Love***, p. 114.

Diotima's suggestion in the ***Symposium*** that Love is a daimon, an intermediary between human beings and the gods.[16] Nor are we referring to the daimon—as Socrates does in the ***Phaedrus***[17] and the ***Apology***[18] **—**as an inner voice that plays the role of conscience. Norton and Kille's use of the term suggests that in this context we ought to understand a daimon as one's ***true self***, ***unique essence,*** or as Brümmer puts it, "hidden potentiality.")

According to Norton and Kille, ***eros*** is a love that "sees something"—an "ideal possibility"—within the beloved.[19] That ideal possibility is one's daimon. Human beings are like the busts of Silenus, hollow clay on the outside with a golden figurine hidden inside; ***eros*** is the "power which discerns the golden figure within the clay."[20] The clay is a person's outward appearance; always flawed in some respect, it constitutes his ***actuality***. But "within his actuality is the golden figurine which love discerns"—his daimon.[21] Each person's daimon is unique and constitutes his true self; as such, attached to a person's daimon is a unique ***value***.

Norton and Kille acknowledge the popular criticisms we raised above (for example, that love of ideals is not love of persons), but they think that their interpretation of Plato—centered on the notion of an "***indwelling*** ideal"—defeats these objections. Such criticisms, they claim, confuse the distinction between actuality and possibility and fail to acknowledge that ***eros*** focuses on the latter rather than the former.[22] ***Eros*** effectively removes the emphasis from a person's actuality and focuses instead on his daimon, which he "most essentially is."[23]

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[16] See lines 202e-203b.

[17] See line 242c.

[18] See line 31d.

[19] ***Philosophies of Love***, p. 97.

[20] ***Ibid.***

[21] ***Ibid.*** This appears to be the same thing Robert Johann is referring to when he speaks of a "deep and profound center which is [a person's self]." (***The Meaning of Love***, p. 35)

[22] ***Philosophies of Love***, p. 98.

[23] ***Ibid.***

Although this may be a satisfactory response to the charges leveled against ***eros***, I find it unlikely that this interpretation accurately represents Plato's own view, and it seems even more unlikely that it captures the intention of Diotima's speech. But this framework accords well with the theory of love I endorse: a viable theory should regard as indispensable the claim that love is "the knowledge and love of someone's individual daimon,"[24] and is that which "holds before [the beloved] a mirror in which to rediscover his daimon" and therefore enables the beloved to "becom[e] himself."[25]

In order to illustrate the appeal of this concept, consider once again Tolstoy's claim that when you love a person, you love the ***whole*** person. Against this notion we might cite, for the sake of argument, the following two objections: (1) most if not all of the time, there are things about our beloved that we know about and ***don't*** love (e.g., his failure to put the toilet seat down). In any case, (2) it's impossible to know everything about a person; there's always the chance of discovering that one thing about him or her that we ***don't*** love**.** In light of these remarks, how does Tolstoy's maxim still seem to ring true? Norton and Kille's insight nudges us in the right direction: at the most fundamental level, I do not only love the imperfect ways in which a person instantiates ideals, but also (and especially) his daimon. Some of his imperfect actualities are things that, in themselves, I cannot bring myself to love, but his daimon ***is*** loveable in itself; further, it constitutes a good so unique and

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[24] ***The Model of Love***, p. 117. The view that knowledge is crucial to love is challenged (rather unsuccessfully, I think) by Stendhal's theory of crystallization, which holds that the lover interprets everything as proof of the perfection of the beloved and that love therefore thrives on epistemic distance and untruth. Although it is true that we believe untruths about the ones we love, and that sometimes we are resistant to the idea of revising those beliefs (even when their falsehood is staring us in the face), this by no means establishes that illusion is an ***essential*** feature of the love relationship. To the extent that his theory has accurately described some interpersonal phenomenon, it must not have been love. If it were, we would require a new term for the experience of those that corresponds to the concept expounded here, and it simply accords better with common sense to retain the positive connotation of the term "love" and regard Stendhal's theory as descriptive of an immature or incomplete love.

[25] ***Philosophies of Love***, p. 99.

incomparable that the actualities accompanying it—loveable or otherwise—are in some sense overshadowed and excluded from my consideration.

Couched in slightly different language, we might say that when we truly love a person, the deep knowledge of whom he is at his core renders insignificant our disapproval of the incidental features of his identity that we do ***not*** love; we know the ***core***, and ***that*** is what we most fundamentally love.[26] As a first approximation, then, we should say that in a significant sense we ***do*** love the "whole person," "all of him": we love the very features that sustain his unique identity and make him who he is rather than someone else. On this view, what we love—the whole person—is identical with an indivisible core that spills over and saturates every other aspect of the beloved's identity and infuses those aspects with deep meaning, with the result that we often regard with fondness certain traits or behaviors that would appall us if exemplified by some other person.

This formulation has some plausibility, but it is important to emphasize that a person's core or daimon is not the ***whole*** person; rather, the daimon is a person's true self, as Norton and Kille suggest. The relevant connection is that a person's core or daimon ***manifests itself*** in the whole person, and manifests itself totally.[27] This emanation of value—the manifestation of the beloved's core in even his problematic traits—is what allows us to ***accept*** those traits. It may be objected that acceptance is not the same thing as love, and so perhaps we have accomplished little in the way of showing that it is possible to love the

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[26] This suggestion accords well with Jacques Maritain's view that, in love, "we love the deepest, the most substantial and hidden, the most existing reality of the beloved being. This is a metaphysical center deeper than all the qualities and essences which we can find and enumerate in the beloved." (***The Person and the Common Good***, p. 39) Similarly, Victor Frankl wrote that "love is the only way to grasp another human being in the innermost core of his personality." (***Man's Search for Meaning***, p. 134.)

[27] I am encouraged by having found a similar statement in Martin Buber: "[Whereas before the lover had experienced] things as aggregates of qualities... [in the beloved he sees] the core that reveal[s] itself powerfully in the You, ***embracing all qualities: the substance***." (***I and Thou***, p. 81, italics mine.)

whole person. The appropriate response to such an objection is that insofar as love of the whole person requires a pure love of each of the component parts of the whole, rather than their mere acceptance, such love is impossible; the problem posed by objections (1) and (2) above remains insoluble.

We can move beyond the impasse generated by the intersection of that problem with Tolstoy's dictum, however, if only we recognize that we can retain the basic principle that underlies that dictum without necessarily making any mention of the "whole person" as such. If the beloved's true self, which we love, is manifested in every facet of his being, and if I accept those facets that I do not love precisely on account of their participation in the true self, then effectively I have allowed my love to guide my acceptance of those features, and have established a direct point of contact between not only any undesirable feature and the true (loved) self, but also between my love and a given undesirable feature.

Perhaps a better way of moving beyond this impasse is to refer back to the preliminary remarks of part I and argue that objections (1) and (2) above wrongly presuppose that undesirable characteristics are within the domain of love. Why should we believe that it is even a matter of loving or not loving uninstantiated universals (e.g., the ***property*** of being willing to put the toilet seat down)?[28] In fact, it seems that there is considerable similarity between our affective attitudes concerning the often trivial characteristics we wish our beloved had and the kinds of objects of our "love" we safely dismissed in part I. I do not ***love*** bathroom etiquette and my beloved's conscientious observation of it any more than I ***love*** Chinese food; these are both things that I ***like***. I submit that for any unloved characteristic of the beloved, if its opposite were miraculously instantiated, it would not be appropriate to say that I ***love*** that new characteristic. I would be pleased (perhaps even exultant), but that would only

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[28] In her essay "Friends as Ends in Themselves," Badhwar agrees that incidental characteristics are not the objects of our love. According to her, the beloved is "seen as loveable on account of what she essentially is, and not just on account of incidental features..." (Cited in ***Eros, Agape, and Philia,*** p. 166.)

be because the person that I love now has yet another characteristic that I ***like***. It is not the addition or subtraction of likeable qualities that determines the scope and depth of my love; that idea presupposes that "like" and "love" are commensurable when in fact they are not. (Recall our discussion of "fondness" in ***What Love is Not,*** above.) In summing up, it will be useful to quote Brümmer at some length.

> I could have admiration for James because he has some admirable characteristics. This implies...that I would admire William as well if he should have the same characteristics... [and that] my admiration for James would stop if he should lose his admirable characteristics...in other words, my admiration is directed primarily at James' characteristics and secondarily at James as the instantiation of these characteristics. In this respect love is different, since it is directed toward a person as a particular and not as an instantiation. Since I do not love you ***because of*** your characteristics, my love for you does not entail that I should...love everybody else who has the same characteristics, nor that I should stop loving you [if you lost them]...My love for you is a love for ***you*** and not for your characteristics apart from you. I could also love you in spite of disapproving of your characteristics. The only thing which my love for you excludes is that I should be indifferent to your characteristics...both love and admiration require an objective appraisal of the characteristics of their...objects, but admiration is based on the outcome of this appraisal, whereas love is not.[29]

This shows that when we talk of loving persons, it is axiomatic that we love something essential, unique, immutable, and irreplaceable. The point is that in order to uphold Tolstoy's maxim, we need not actually love everything about

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[29] ***The Model of Love***, p. 152.

the beloved precisely because none of the non-core characteristics are even capable of being loved in ***principle***. Rather, it is a matter of liking or not liking these things. This suggests that the entire discourse is misguided: the claim that "in love, we love the whole person," if tenable, must concern something quite apart from the ordinary discussion of surface-level characteristics, which is what I have attempted to address by instead discussing the beloved's daimon.

Such a discussion is necessary because it is important from a theoretical perspective to be able to secure the possibility of loving and being loved as a ***whole***.[30] Only then have we achieved the "full intimacy of love," in which "the full person is known..."[31] Nozick thinks that to be known fully is for the lover to know about the traits that put one at risk of being unlovable—insecurities, character defects, and "areas of incompetence."[32] Although such disclosure, issuing from trust and openness, is essential to being loved for the person one truly is, I think that in order for the beloved to be "fully known," the lover must also have knowledge of what makes the beloved truly irreplaceable and indispensable to him; it will be the knowledge of a unique essence at the beloved's core, as I've suggested. To be known "fully" means that our lover "knows us as we are,"[33] but to be known as we are, I think, means for our true self to be known. And what constitutes ***that*** is our daimon.

Two closely related objections that might be raised against what has been said about a person's core or daimon are that (1) there is no reason to suppose that individuals have cores as such, or that in loving a person we love such a core and that (2) even if persons have such cores, it is not plausible that they are immutable or unchanging (i.e., in loving one's core, the objection goes, we only love a cluster of contingent, incidental features).The first objection, I think, can be defeated while addressing the second. On the assumption that such a thing as

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[30] For one thing, we typically feel that our beloved's love for us is not "genuine" or "complete" if we come to find that he or she loves us not for "who we are" as a whole, but rather for some quality or set of qualities we possess.

[31] ***The Examined Life***, p. 75.

[32] ***Ibid***.

[33] ***Ibid.***

a core exists within human persons, if it were the case that a person's core could change, we would not be loving the same person over a long period of time and over the course of countless changes (both positive and negative) to that person's interests, personality, and identity.

Take, for example, the above-mentioned problem of undesirable (unloved) characteristics of the beloved. We hope for the improvement of the beloved, that is, for the elimination of these characteristics. But we don't hope for this improvement ***so that*** we can (finally) love them—we already do, and so what we really desire is that the object of our love be someone we also ***like*** through and through. By hypothesis, both before and after the desired improvement we love the person in question. But this shows that our love cannot depend upon those specific characteristics being improved. It also suggests that our love does not depend upon the ***other*** set of superficial characteristics (that is, the positive ones not in need of improvement). We can see, then, that it is both necessary and sufficient to posit a core that underlies ***all*** characteristics for the purpose of explaining the endurance of love throughout myriad changes to interests, personality, and identity. (It may be useful to tie this concept to inquiries concerning personal identity. From what has been said here, it would be correct to infer that I equate personhood with the possession of such a core. A person's true or essential self is her daimon. And the suggestion that such a core is unchanging should be accepted lest we succumb to the pitfalls associated with being unable to explain the persistence of persons through time. Thus, the mystery of the endurance of love throughout changes to the beloved runs parallel to the mystery of the persistence of persons through time—both of which are solved by positing a metaphysical core.) Further, we can see that this core must be immutable and unchanging, or else it would itself be simply a cluster of ***more*** characteristics, ***themselves prone to change without effecting a change in our love***. In short, if everything were changing, we would not love the same person over time.[34] Instead, we would repeatedly be pursuing

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[34] It might be objected that in fact we ***don't*** always love the same person over time, and that "falling out of love" would be impossible if the beloved's core were unchanging. It is true that

relationships with people who happen at a given time to be the best exemplars of the characteristics we like or "love."[35]

From what has been said, it is clear that the sort of knowledge that is required for love is not concerned with the contingencies of the beloved's identity; as a lover, I must be in possession of some knowledge more profound than the mere aggregate of incidental facts (e.g., the beloved's favorite movies or music, or personal history more broadly). Why? Knowledge of the beloved is under discussion precisely because it would be useful to have at our disposal a causal explanation of the formation of love, viz. how and why we begin to love a particular person in the first place. And it seems unlikely that knowledge of any particular (incomplete and contingent) set of personal characteristics—the stuff of mundane knowledge of the beloved—could serve as an adequate explanation of why we begin to love someone. In a trivial sense, loving someone ordinarily requires first knowing (and being attracted to) those personal characteristics, but this has less to do with a direct causal explanation of love than an explanation of why we devote the time to the person in question that's required for the acquisition of knowledge of their essence or core. And I

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the reality of falling out of love poses a prima facie difficulty for the view that we most fundamentally love an unchanging core; if personal characteristics are unessential in the formation and therefore also in the decay of love, and if an incomparable and irreplaceable value always inheres in the immutable core of the beloved, what could explain the lover's withdrawal? I can think of two possible answers. First, and most importantly, recall that knowledge of another's daimon is a ***seeing*** or ***perceiving***. When we stop loving a person, the person's daimon hasn't changed; rather, it's that we've stopped perceiving the value of the person's daimon—we've lost the knowledge of it, so to speak. The beloved's core has remained the same, but the lover's perception of it has become obscured or perhaps overshadowed by negative non-core features of the beloved. Second, it may be that what we sometimes call "falling out of love" is not the loss of knowledge of the core (or a change in the core itself), but rather the knowledge's sudden failure to produce in the lover the emotions it once did.

[35] This state of affairs is precisely what we would expect to be the case if ***Plato*** were correct. As Badhwar reminds us, "in the Platonic view...the object of love is not the person, not ***that individual with those qualities***, but rather ***those qualities in any individual***." (From "Friends as Ends in Themselves," p. 169. Cited in ***Eros, Agape, and Philia***.)

believe it is rather this latter acquisition that stands in a causal relation with love.

Perhaps the reader will agree at this point that love requires knowledge of the beloved's core or daimon. Of course, she may still be curious about the precise content of such core—or what it is, exactly, of which we (as lovers) must have knowledge. Unfortunately I do not have an answer that will hold true in every love relation. Part of the reason for this, however, is simply that the contents of daimons are, by definition, unique to specific persons. The further inability to concretely specify even clear formal features—while certainly problematic—is, I think, a problem that ***any*** theorist of personal identity faces.

Although I have characterized the emotional response as dependent upon this uncommon knowledge of the beloved's own profound truth, in some sense it is nonetheless possible to experience emotions ordinarily called "love" without the deep knowledge of the beloved described here. This phenomenon—"love" as simply an emotion without knowledge—is precisely what we find in the courtly tradition, which thrives on distance and suffering. How might we bring this into agreement with the more general claim that love, the emotion, occurs only as a response to knowledge? As mentioned in part II, Roberts entertains the idea that love is properly understood as an emotion only to the extent that it readily disposes us toward a host of other emotions. I think that this is right, and it is especially useful for present purposes. Adapting Roberts's principle to our model, we might say that what disposes us toward the relevant emotions is indeed love, but that this is simply (or at least initially) the deep knowledge discussed above. If Roberts's claim (or my modification of it) is correct, then there is nothing to prevent an individual from experiencing those emotions when unprovoked by love (knowledge); indeed, the emotions that love is capable of producing probably occur at a greater frequency in an individual's emotional life ***outside*** of the context of love. Thus one feels joy, sadness, anger, and empathy even when one does not love. Likewise, in the love-without-knowledge phenomenon, the courtly lover experiences some of the emotions characteristically produced by love itself (e.g., passionate desire and suffering,

anxiety and frustration) but not love proper. In this sense, it seems more reasonable to call such an individual's experience not love, but rather something superficially resembling it, that is, a more or less groundless experience of the range of emotions that love is capable of eliciting. It is a mistake to think, as the courtly lover does, that such emotions could ***be*** love; at best, they are the sensations and feelings that love ***produces in us.*** But we can see that in the context at hand even ***that*** is too much, since ***love's*** production of emotions hinges on the prior acquisition of knowledge of an incomparable value of the beloved, the utter ***absence*** of which is the defining feature of courtly love.

One final remark: the case of courtly love can, I think, also be used to corroborate the basic presupposition of this project, namely that love ought not to be construed as a mere emotion. The courtly lover has all of the relevant emotions, but other than that they all happen to take the same intentional object, there is nothing to distinguish such a lover from an individual who feels exactly the same emotions without loving anyone. It is both undesirable and inadequate to define love merely as what happens when the feelings of joy, anger, and sadness all happen to concern some individual, and so we must further posit their grounding, knowledge.

IV

Love between persons is a relation which is embedded in an attitude and evidenced by characteristic emotions. But, most importantly, it has as its occasion and its source a deep and intimate knowledge. This knowledge is not unlike the knowledge that Norton and Kille believe is posited by Platonic ***eros***. If their interpretation of Plato is correct, then the theory put forth here would have as its basis metaphysical postulates of a roughly Platonic nature. I have attempted, however, to outline the ways in which this theory escapes the popular criticisms issued against Platonic ***eros***. I have also provided a working sketch of what a "metaphysical core" might look like in form, and I have argued that the possibility of the existence of such cores should be taken seriously. This has

been accomplished primarily through a discussion of the terms intrinsic to the philosophy of love. But I have also drawn on resources outside of this field—namely, those in metaphysics itself—and have invoked the subject of personal identity as one that provides ***prima facie*** support for the claims I have made. That is, whereas the denial of a metaphysical core leaves us defenseless in the face of the problem of the persistence of human persons, an affirmation of such a core not only bodes well with a general theory of the nature of love, but also serves as a good starting point for any theory of personal identity.

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